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DOES LAND ABUNDANCE EXPLAIN AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS?
JAMES FENSKE†
ABSTRACT. The land abundance view of African history uses sparse population to explain
pre-colonial land tenure and slavery. I document the geographic forcing variables that
predict land rights, slavery, and population density in a cross section of global societies. I
discuss whether these correlations support theories of land rights and slavery, including
the land abundance view. I show that pre-colonial institutions predict institutional out-
comes in Africa in the present, including land transactions, polygamy, and public goods.
Pre-colonial institutions have effects above those of geography. The colonial reversal of
fortune did not erase their influence.
1. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to Europe and Asia, Africa was less densely populated at the beginning of
the twentieth century (Herbst, 2000, p. 16). By then, slavery was widespread in Africa
(Lovejoy, 2000). Land tenure on much of the continent was, and still is, characterized
by group rights and overlapping claims (Bruce et al., 1994). The “land abundance” view
of African history connects these facts (Austin, 2008a; Hopkins, 1973; Iliffe, 1995). From
this perspective, since land was not scarce, it had no price, and rights over it were ill-
defined. Because independent farmers could not be persuaded to become hired work-
ers, coerced and household labor substituted for wage employment.
In this paper, I use cross-sectional data on a sample of global societies to uncover the
geographic forcing variables that have jointly determined historical land rights, slav-
ery, and population density. I then use modern survey data to show that these past
institutions predict institutional outcomes in Africa today. Though these exercises are
ultimately descriptive, they are carried out with three purposes in mind. First, I add to
our knowledge of the relationship between geography and institutions. Second, I use
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these results to evaluate whether existing theories of institutions, including the land
abundance view, fit the facts. Third, I use the persistent influence of these institutions
to draw conclusions about the relative importance of geography and institutions, and
about the colonial “reversal of fortune.”
I take data on institutions from the cross-section of global societies included in Mur-
dock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas. Combining maps of these societies with multiple
sources of spatial data, I examine whether geographic features can predict the patterns
of land rights, slavery, and population density in this sample. I test for persistent effects
of these institutions within Africa. First, I use the Ghana Living Standards Study (GLSS)
to investigate whether historical patterns of land rights predict differences in how plots
of land are acquired in the present. Second, I use the Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) to test for persistence in the prevalence of polygamy and for adverse effects of
past slavery on the provision of public goods today.
Both land rights and slavery are correlated with the geographic features of the ethnic
groups that practice them. Notably, the groups in my sample are more likely to possess
rights over land if land quality is better. Within Africa, there is a positive correlation be-
tween land quality and slavery, but this does not hold in the full global sample. Many of
the correlates of institutions and population become insignificant when fixed effects are
included for ethnographic regions that approximate continents, and the determinants
of institutions within Africa differ from those in the full sample.
Influential theories of land rights emphasize population pressure and the market value
of output as key determinants of property institutions. The results here suggest that
rights existed historically where land was most scarce and more valuable, though there
is only mixed evidence that access to trade was a determining factor. The most widely
accepted theories of slavery in the literature focus on labor scarcity, workers’ outside
options, and the productivity of slavery in specific tasks. My results suggest that slavery
evolves with time alongside population. The results here do not offer unqualified sup-
port for any particular theory of slavery. In particular, the fragility of the main results
when explaining intra-regional differences suggests that the causes of slavery may dif-
fer across regions, may depend on unobserved characteristics of these regions, or that
intra-regional institutional spill-overs weaken the link between institutions and local
geographic endowments.
In the present, I compare Ghanaian ethnic groups in which a child could inherit a par-
ent’s land with groups in which land could pass out of the nuclear family through inheri-
tance. Where the nuclear family was strong in the past relative to the wider lineage, land
is more likely to be acquired through commercial transactions today. I show that women
whose ethnic groups regularly practiced polygamy before colonial rule are more likely
to be in polygamous marriages today. Children born in African ethnic groups where
slavery existed in the past receive fewer vaccinations today. Pre-colonial African insti-
tutions, then, continue to exert a persistent influence over and above the effects of the
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geographic features that have shaped them. Whatever “reversal of fortune” may have
occurred as a result of colonial rule, pre-colonial institutions that matter in the present
were not entirely swept away by the process of colonization and decolonization.
I contribute to our understanding of historical institutions and to the role of geogra-
phy in shaping them. Land tenure and slavery matter in the present. Rights over land
shape investment incentives (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), labor-supply (Field, 2007), and
violence (Andre and Platteau, 1998). Nunn (2008a) shows that those African countries
that exported the most slaves are comparatively poor today. These effects are not lim-
ited to Africa. Within the Americas, legacies of slavery explain differences in income
across countries and U.S. counties (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Nunn, 2008b), as well
as long term racial gaps in education and income (Miller, 2011; Sacerdote, 2005).
Other historical “ethnic” institutions also matter today. Pre-colonial states predict
economic activity (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012), provision of public goods
(Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007), and governance (Acemoglu et al., 2002a). The existence
of polygamy reduces the incentives to invest in capital (Tertilt, 2005). Local institutions
such as land rights and polygamy have been resilient to national policies (Bubb, 2009;
Fenske, 2012a). As little is known about the origins of institutions that have not been
established by Europeans, I add to our knowledge of the evolution of institutions.
Bio-geographic features such as continental orientation (Diamond, 1997), domestica-
ble species (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005), population (Acemoglu et al., 2002b), settler mor-
tality (Acemoglu et al., 2001), ruggedness (Nunn and Puga, 2012) and crop suitability
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997) predict contemporary institutional differences across
countries (Easterly and Levine, 2003). Though the existing literature has focused largely
on the effect of geography on institutions created by Europeans, there are exceptions.
Michalopoulos et al. (2010) and Michalopoulos (2011) link heterogeneity in land quality
to both ethnic fragmentation and the spread of Islam. I continue this line of research by
testing what geographic features of societies predict land rights, slavery, and population
density.
In Section 2, I describe my sources of data and the econometric specifications that I
use. In Section 3, I report my results and discuss their robustness. Detailed robustness
checks are confined to the web appendix. In Section 4, I discuss the theories of land
rights and slavery that are consistent with these results, including the “land abundance”
view. In Section 5, I show that pre-colonial institutions in Africa have persistent effects
on institutions in the present. In Section 6, I conclude.
2. SPECIFICATIONS AND DATA
2.1. Specifications. My base sample is a cross section of 1,205 pre-industrial societies
from around the world. I investigate the geographic determinants of land rights, slavery,
and historic population density by estimating:
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yij = x
′
ijβ + δj + ij,(1)
where yij is an outcome of interest for society i in ethnographic region j. In practice,
this will be an indicator for the presence of land rights, an indicator for the presence of
slavery, or the natural log of historic population density. xij is a vector of geographical
controls that describe the society’s historic territory. These controls will include land
quality, date of observation, average annual precipitation, temperature, absolute lati-
tude, the share of area in which malaria is prevalent, distance from the coast, elevation,
presence of a major river, ruggedness, the share of area that is desert, the coefficient of
variation of rainfall over time, and a constant. δj is a fixed effect for the major ethno-
graphic regions: Africa (the omitted category), the circum-Mediterranean, East Eurasia
(which includes the Indian subcontinent), the Insular Pacific, North America, and South
America. i is random error.
Where the outcome yij is binary, I estimate (1) using a logit. Where yij is continuous, I
use ordinary least squares (OLS). I correct standard errors for spatial dependence using
the method outlined by Conley (1999).1 I allow spatial dependence up to a distance of
ten decimal degrees. For each outcome of interest, I estimate (1) on the full sample with
and without the fixed effects δj . I also estimate (1) on a “sub-Saharan Africa” sample
that includes Ethiopia and the Horn and the Moslem Sudan, regions that my data source
codes as Circum-Mediterranean. In the remainder of this section, I discuss my sources
of data. Details of all variables and their sources are in the web appendix.
2.2. Data on institutions. Data on institutions are taken from Murdock’s (1967) Ethno-
graphic Atlas. This is a database of 1,267 societies from around the world. It contains
categorical variables describing several institutional and cultural features of these soci-
eties, usually at the time of first description by Europeans. From this sample, I remove
2 duplicate observations (the Chilcotin and Tokelau), 8 societies observed before 1500
(Ancient Egypt, Aryans, Babylonia, Romans, Icelander, Uzbeg, Khmer, Hebrews), and 52
for which land quality information is missing (mostly small Pacific islands). This leaves
a base sample of 1,205 societies. 801 of these have data on land rights, 1,040 on slavery.
I construct binary variables for whether land rights or slavery exist. Summary statis-
tics are given in Table 1. For each society, I observe land rights and slavery at the same
point in time. I map slavery in Figure 1.
Why use this data? The principal justification is availability. This is the only source
of cross-cultural information on land rights and slavery that has global scope. The only
other alternative, the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample of Murdock and White (1969), is
a derivative of the Ethnographic Atlas. In addition, the variables were compiled by the
same author, and so are internally consistent. The benefit of looking at pre-colonial so-
cieties is that they allow me to correlate institutions with the geographic characteristics
1In particular, I use the commands xgmlt and x ols that are posted on his website.
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of the societies that adopted them. Colonial institutions, by contrast, will depend both
on the characteristics of colonizing and colonized societies. The use of a global sample,
rather than an African sample, introduces additional institutional variation and makes
it possible to test whether the geographic correlates of institutions in Africa are the same
as those in the rest of the world.
The greatest concern with these data is that they may be anachronistic. They are in-
tended to cover societies at an idealized, timeless and synchronic moment of first Euro-
pean description. In practice, however, many of the observations are constructed from
the works of colonial anthropologists. It is clear from Figure 1, however, that most of
the observations are intended to be uncontaminated by colonial rule. While colonial
governments generally abolished slavery sooner or later, what is coded in the data is
what anthropologists recorded as a society’s “historical” institutions; there is still much
slavery in Africa according to the Ethnographic Atlas. In so far as the date at which a
society is observed is a proxy for colonial effects and the severity of measurement error,
I control for it in the econometric analysis. The Atlantic slave trade, by contrast, does
pre-date the observations of the African societies in these data. I discuss this possible
contamination in Section 3.2.
The use of Murdock’s (1967) data is not unique to this paper. Baker and Jacobsen
(2007b) use descriptive statistics from the Ethnographic Atlas to motivate a model of
the gender division of labor. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) have aggregated its data on
state centralization to the country level using ethnic population numbers from the Atlas
Narodov Mira (1964) in order to show that African countries with stronger pre-colonial
states provide more public goods today. Bezemer et al. (2009) have performed a sim-
ilar exercise, showing that the historical prevalence of slavery across African societies
predicts lower incomes in the present.
Work also exists that attempts to explain variables recorded in ethnographic sources.
Whatley and Gillezeau (2011) show that coastal regions in Africa hit hardest by the slave
trade are more ethnically fragmented in the present, using a map of ethnic groups from
Murdock (1959). Whatley (2012) shows that these same regions have more absolutist
political structures, as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. Murdock and White (1969)
created the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample as a spin-off from the Ethnographic Atlas,
containing a larger number of variables for a smaller sample of societies. Matthew Baker
has used this and other ethnographic sources to validate models of the transition to
agriculture (Baker, 2008), hunter-gatherer territoriality (Baker, 2003), land inheritance
rules (Baker and Miceli, 2005), and post-marital residence patterns (Baker and Jacobsen,
2007a).
More recent treatments have combined the Ethnographic Atlas with spatial data on
geographic characteristics. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012), for example, show
that economic activity measured using nighttime lights is greater in parts of Africa with
more centralized states before colonial rule. Excluding other work of my own (Fenske,
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2012b), the only other paper of which I am aware that has used geographic data to pre-
dict outcomes recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas is Alesina et al. (2011). They use the
suitability of an ethnic group’s territory for plough-intensive crops to predict the his-
toric gender division of labor in agriculture, which in turn explains female labor force
participation rates today.
FIGURE 1. Slavery
Red circles indicate presence of slavery. Blue circles indicate absence.
2.3. Population density. In order to construct population density estimates for these
societies, I first match these societies to ethnic maps. Next, I join these maps to raster
data on historical population density. I begin with five ethnic maps. First, I join African
societies to ethnic groups mapped by Murdock (1959). Second, I merge First Nations
groups in the United States and Canada with maps from the Handbook of North Amer-
ican Indians (Heizer and Sturtevant, 1978).2 Third, I join ethnic groups from the rest of
the world to Global Mapping International’s (GMI) detailed World Language Mapping
System. Fourth, if no match can be found in the GMI map, I use the less detailed Geo-
Referencing Ethnic Groups (GREG) map of Weidmann et al. (2010). Finally, if no match
can be found in any of these, I match groups to modern administrative boundaries. For
example, the Nunivak are matched to Nunivak Island.
I use the historical maps first in order to reduce migration-induced errors. The Mur-
dock (1959) and Heizer and Sturtevant (1978) maps show ethnic groups prior to Eu-
ropean contact. I am not aware of similar historical maps for Asia or Latin America,
necessitating use of the more modern GMI and GREG maps. Of 1,267 societies, 76 are
matched to a larger group of which they form a smaller part (such as the Efik to the
Ibibio). 100 groups that cannot be found in any map, instead of being matched to a
modern administrative boundary, are matched to polygons representing ethnic groups
2These were digitized for the United States by Dippel (2010) and for Canada by myself.
LAND ABUNDANCE 7
in the same location. For example, the Kara of Ukerewe Island do not appear in any
of the ethnic maps. Because the Kerewe people occupy roughly the same territory as
the Kara, the Kara are assigned the geographic characteristics of the polygon labeled
“Kerewe” in the Murdock (1959) map. A full table of matches and a map of the assem-
bled polygons are given in the web appendix.3
All historical population reconstructions are guesses. One book on pre-Columbian
America is entitled “Numbers from Nowhere” (Henige, 1998). The principal measure I
use for historical population density is from the History Database of the Global Envi-
ronment (HYDE) version 3.1. This raster data on historical population covers the years
1500, 1600, and every ten years since 1700. For each ethnic group, I measure historical
population density as the average of the raster points within its territory for the year of
observation recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.4
Details of these estimates are reported by Bouwman et al. (2006), Klein Goldewijk
et al. (2010) and Klein Goldewijk (2005). This data source takes as its base a map of 3441
administrative units from 222 countries. Historical data are then reconstructed on this
base map using Lahmeyer (2004), Helders (2000), Tobler (1995), several local studies,
interpolation, and back projection. The data are reported on a five minute grid.
I plot historical population density for my base sample of ethnic groups in Figure 2. I
present the percentiles of the HYDE data and the two principal alternatives, described
below, in Table 1. These range from nearly zero persons per square mile for several
groups in the Mato Grosso and interior Amazon, to over 3,000 persons per square mile
for the Okinawans of Japan.5
Because historical population reconstruction is unavoidably inexact, it is important
to show that the results can be obtained using alternatives to the HYDE estimates.
The alternative sources of historical population data are not in raster format, and are
often recorded at a lower resolution than the observations in the Ethnographic Atlas.
For example, one number may be given for an entire country. I adopt a simple method
to estimate spatially disaggregated historic population densities for the societies in my
data using these alternative sources. I begin with raster data on population density in
3The Ethnographic Atlas gives co-ordinates for each society. All but 46 of these societies are within 500
km of the centroid of the polygon to which they are joined. Of these discrepancies, 22 are due to obvious
errors in the Ethnographic Atlas. For example, the Ethnographic Atlas gives the Koreans a coordinate that
is in Tibet. 14 are groups that cover diffuse areas, making it difficult to assign them a meaningful coordi-
nate. These include Russians and the Eastern Cree. 8 are given coordinates in the Ethnographic Atlas that
differ from their locations in the other maps for no obvious reason. The remaining two are idiosyncratic.
The GMI map divides the Botocudos into 3 polygons. Two of are in Minas Gerais, as expected, but one is
in Rio Grande do Sul. Second, the polygon that represents the Diegueno in Heizer and Sturtevant (1978)
is truncated at the US border.
4For computational reasons, I use data from each 50 year interval, imputing intermediate years exponen-
tially.
5This is an over-estimate due to over-representation of Naha in the original data; administrate records
give a modern density of just above 1,500 persons per square mile. Results are similar if I exclude the
Okinawans (see the web appendix).
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FIGURE 2. Historical population density
Red circles indicate denser population. Blue circles indicate sparser population.
1995 for each of these ethnic groups and combine it with historical estimates for the
broader regions within which these groups are located. Specifically, my alternative esti-
mates take the form:
Historical population density =Population density in 1995×(2)
Regional density at the date of observation
Regional density in 1995
.
This assumes that the relative distribution of population has not changed within re-
gions over time. If the Tamil were 1.37 times as dense as the entirety of the broad re-
gion “India” in 1995, this ratio is pushed back to 1880, the date at which they are ob-
served. GIS data on population in 1995 is from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s
Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (FAO-GAEZ). I use two sources of regional esti-
mates. The first is McEvedy and Jones (1978). There are well-known problems with
these data (Austin, 2008b; Hopkins, 2009), and so I also use the ARVE Group’s estimates
(Krumhardt, 2010).
While only a first-order approximation, this approach is preferable to using the un-
weighted regional densities directly. McEvedy and Jones (1978), for example, assign a
single population density to all of Canada. To treat the the Inuit and Ojibwe as equally
dense would be implausible, and would introduce substantial measurement error.6 In
addition to these two main alternatives, I use the 1995 densities directly.
6Ruff (2006) suggests that the Northeast had a population density at contact roughly seven times that of
the Arctic. The method used here assigns the Ojibwe a historic population density of 2.20 per square mile
and the Copper Eskimo a population density of 0.31 per square mile – a roughly seven-fold difference.
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These data reveal a positive correlation between land rights and historic population
density, and an inverse-U relationship between slavery and historic population den-
sity (see Figure 3). As I discuss in Section 4, this is consistent with certain models that
make arguments similar to the land abundance view. This is not, however, dispositive.
Population density and institutions are both shaped by the same geographic forcing
variables. As a result, I gather data on several other geographic characteristics of these
societies, and test the extent to which historic population and institutions are predicted
by features of the natural environment.
FIGURE 3. Slavery and historical population density
2.4. Geographic data. I join societies from the Ethnographic Atlas to several sources of
geographic raster data. Sources and definitions for each variable are given in the web
appendix. Each of the continuous variables are re-scaled as a standard normal variable
for the regressions, so that marginal effects can be interpreted as the effect of a one
standard-deviation change in the geographic variable.
The first control is land quality. To measure this, I re-scale Fischer et al.’s (2002) index
of climate, soil and terrain slope constrains on rain-fed agriculture. Larger values of the
re-scaled variable indicate better land. An advantage of this constraints-based measure
is that it is not based on expected yields in contemporary agriculture. Crop diversity is
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greater today for many of the societies than at the time they are observed in the Ethno-
graphic Atlas.7 I also control for the presence of a major river, distance to the coast,
elevation, the percentage of the society’s territory in which malaria is endemic, precip-
itation, ruggedness, temperature, date of observation, absolute latitude, share desert,
and the coefficient of variation of annual rainfall. This latter variable is intended as a
measure of ecological risk.
2.5. Modern outcomes. I use two separate approaches to test whether African institu-
tions have persistent influences in the present day. First, I use plot-level data from the
fifth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), conducted in 2005-2006. Us-
ing the ethnic groups reported in these data, I am able to merge plots with their users’
historical institutions as recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. I use OLS to estimate:
yij = βinstitutionj + x
′
ijγ + ij.(3)
Here, yij is an indicator for the manner in which plot i, currently used by a mem-
ber ethnic group j, was acquired. I use indicators for whether the plot has purchased,
rented, sharecropped, or acquired from family as outcomes. institutionj is the presence
or absence of an historical institution for the plot controller’s ethnic group. β is the coef-
ficient of interest. Because all ethnic groups merged to these plots possessed rights over
land in the past, I use two alternative indicators of historic land rights for institutionj .
First, I record whether land inheritance is patrilineal. Second, I record whether land was
inherited by children. Here, I follow Goody (1969, p. 65), who argues that:
[T]he scarcer productive resources become and the more intensively they
are used, then the greater the tendency towards the retention of these re-
sources within the basic productive and reproductive unit, which in the
large majority of cases is the nuclear family.
If land is scarce, it is an important consideration in marriage. This puts emphasis on
transmission of property from parents to children. Under patrilineal inheritance, land
may pass from a man to his son or his brother. Under matrilineal inheritance, land
necessarily passes out of the nuclear family to a man’s brother or to his sister’s son. I use
an indicator for whether land is inherited by children as a more precise measure of the
degree to which land is retained within the nuclear family.
Other controls in xij are plot area, plot area squared, the gender of the plot controller,
the age and age squared of the plot controller, dummies for religion, dummies for re-
gion (roughly equivalent to a province), and ecological zone dummies. My final sample
contains 8,669 plots of land. I cluster standard errors by ethnic group.
7I do not adjust this measure to account for the spatial distribution of population, because this approach
is very sensitive to measurement error. For example, it gives implausibly high estimates of land quality in
the Arctic and Sahara.
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Second, I compile data on 494,157 women from 34 sub-Saharan countries captured in
the Demographic and Health Surveys. I have created this data set for a different project,
and the details of these data are reported in Fenske (2012a). Using the ethnic groups
reported in these data, I am able to merge these women with historical institutions from
the Ethnographic Atlas. On this sample of women, I use OLS to estimate:
yijc = βinstitutionj + x
′
ijcγ + δc + ijc.(4)
institutionj is the presence or absence of an historical institution for the woman’s
ethnic group. β is the coefficient of interest. I use past polygamy and past slavery as
measures of institutionj . The first tests directly for the persistence of polygamy as an
institution. The second is motivated by the fact that most slaves retained within Africa
were women, and that many served as the sometimes polygamous wives of their mas-
ters (Robertson and Klein, 1983). The vector of controls, xijc include absolute latitude,
malaria prevalence, sutiability for rainfed agriculture, ruggedness, elevation, distance
to the coast, dummies for ecological type, year of birth, year of birth squared, dummies
for religion, urban, age, and age squared.8 δc is a country-round fixed effect. I cluster
standard errors at the level of the woman’s ethnic group.
In addition, I use the DHS child recodes to collect information on the children born to
these women in the five years preceding the survey. I now estimate (4) taking children as
the unit of observation. The dependent variable yijc is now the number of vaccinations
received. I take this as a proxy for the capacity of the state, and so follow the existing
literature by measuring the ability of states to provide public goods (Berger, 2008; Gen-
naioli and Rainer, 2007). xijc contains the same controls as above, as well as the child
characteristics birth date, birth order, an indicator for a multiple birth, and gender.
3. RESULTS
In this section, I report my main results. I do not interpret these until later, in Section
4. In Section 3.1, I outline the principal geographic correlates of land rights, slavery, and
historic population. In Section 3.2, I outline the robustness checks that are reported in
the web appendix.
3.1. Main results.
3.1.1. Land rights. In Table 2, I report my main results concerning land rights. Land
quality positively predicts land rights in both the full sample and the sub-Saharan Africa
sub-sample. In the baseline, a one standard deviation increase in land quality increases
the probability that land rights exist by 5 percentage points. This effect disappears, how-
ever, when fixed effects for the major ethnographic regions are included.
8Year of birth and age can both be included because these are repeated cross-sections. With country-
round fixed effects, the linear term is dropped due to collinearity.
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Precipitation has a negative and significant correlation with land rights in the base-
line, but this is not significant within the sub-Saharan sample nor with major region
fixed effects included. Temperature is only significantly negative within major regions.
Societies that are observed later are more likely to possess land rights, though this too
does not hold within regions or within sub-Saharan Africa. Malaria prevalence pre-
dicts land rights in all three specifications, though it is statistically weak within sub-
Saharan Africa. Ruggedness positively predicts land rights in the baseline and within
sub-Saharan Africa, though it is not statistically significant within major regions. Land
rights become less common as one moves away from the equator. Distance from the
coast does not predict land rights in the global sample, and predicts greater land rights
within Africa. I find no effect of elevation, the coefficient of variation of rainfall, or ac-
cess to a major river in any specification.
3.1.2. Slavery. In Table 2, I report my main results concerning slavery. There is a pos-
itive but insignificant relationship between land quality and slavery in the global sam-
ple. This is due to the high incidence of slavery in the Pacific Northwest; if a control
is added for a society’s dependence on fishing, the effect of land quality becomes pos-
itive and significant, though not with fixed effects (not reported). Within sub-Saharan
Africa the correlation is larger and more significant. A one standard deviation increase
in land quality predicts a 5 percentage point increase the probability of slavery within
sub-Saharan Africa. I discuss this difference in more detail in Section 4.
The positive correlations of slavery with temperature and malarial prevalence are ro-
bust across specifications and samples. There is a negative correlation between date of
observation and slavery that survives the inclusion of major region fixed effects. It is not
significant within Africa. Similarly, slavery is more common in rugged areas and further
from the equator, even with major-region fixed effects, though these correlations do not
hold within Africa. The magnitude of the correlation between access to a major river
and slavery is large across specifications (5-8 percentage points), though the standard
error is also large and the estimate is not significant with fixed effects. I find no effect
of precipitation, share desert, distance from the coast, elevation, or the coefficient of
variation of rainfall in any specification.
3.1.3. Population density. In Table 2, I report my main results concerning population
density. Here, coefficients can be interpreted directly as the impact of a one standard-
deviation change in the right-hand-side variable. A one standard deviation increase in
land quality is associated here with a large increase in population density; the effect is
between 54 and 73% in the whole-world sample, and 15% in the sub-Saharan sample.
Precipitation depresses population in the base sample and within Africa, though this is
not significant if I include major-region fixed effects. Societies that are observed later are
also more densely settled, though this correlation does not hold within major regions.
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Societies further from the coast are more sparsely settled, though this is only statis-
tically significant within major regions, and does not hold within Africa. Across speci-
fications, there is a negative correlation between population density and elevation. In
the baseline, population is most dense where malaria is most prevalent, though this is
not true within major regions and is of marginal significance within Africa. Rugged so-
cieties are more densely settled, though this too is not significant within major regions.
Societies closer to the equator are more thickly populated. Population density is neg-
atively correlated with the coefficient of variation of rainfall and positively associated
with access to a major river, though these correlations only hold within broad regions,
and not within Afirca. There is no significant link between historical population density
and temperature.
3.1.4. Slavery and crop suitability. In Table 3, I extend the main results concerning slav-
ery. I include the suitability of the ethnic group’s territory for rain-fed cultivation of the
crop types reported by the FAO-GAEZ. These are: cereals, roots/tubers, pulses, oil crops,
sugar, and cotton. The magnitude and significance of the other controls do not change
in any meaningful way from Table 2, excepting that land quality and access to a ma-
jor river now have significant positive correlations with slavery within broad regions.
Roots/tubers and oil crops enter negatively. Pulses and sugar enter positively, though
sugar is only statistically significant with major region fixed effects, or in the African
sub-sample.
3.2. Robustness. Because the institutions reported in the Ethnographic Atlas are re-
ported roughly at the time of first European description, it is possible that African slav-
ery in this sample is contaminated by the institutional legacies of the slave trade. I show
in the web appendix that the effect of ethnicity-level Atlantic slave exports reported by
Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) on indigenous African slavery is insignificant, while there
does appear to be a positive correlation between Indian Ocean slave exports and slavery
across African ethnic groups. If the slave trade were responsible for establishing slavery
in Africa, this would be expected to bias the coefficient on distance from the coast in
a negative direction, since African societies closest to the coast were hardest hit by the
slave trade. If, however, I include an interaction term between “sub-Saharan Africa” and
“distance to coast” in Table 2, the main effect does not change, while the interaction is
small and insignificant (not reported).
The measures of land rights and slavery are coarse indicators. I test in the web appen-
dix whether alternative measures of these institutions give results consistent with Table
2. Similarly, I use three alternative measures of historical population, attempting to re-
create the results of Table 2. While many estimates move in and out of significance, most
of these are small changes in magnitude. Some exceptions are worth noting. Malaria
changes sign when land inheritance by children is used as a dependent variable, and
distance from the coast has a much larger marginal effect when patrilineal inheritance
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of land is used as an outcome. With alternative measures of slavery, date of observation,
temperature and malaria become insignificant and quantitatively small. Date of obser-
vation is a poor predictor of population density in the present day, and the coefficient of
variation of rainfall is not a significant predictor of the alternative historical population
measures.
Because land rights and slavery are missing for several observations, I show in the
web appendix that the results are similar when estimated on a consistent sample for
which both institutions are known. I also show that the main results do not hold when
observations are weighted by their estimated populations. Though this would be ex-
pected to correct the influence of the large number of small societies on the results, it
instead only adds noise to the analysis, because this procedure multiplies any errors in
estimated population densities by errors in estimated area.
Results are broadly similar with absolute latitude excluded. Excluding high leverage
observations also has little effect on the results. Controlling for the possible endogeneity
of land quality, I show that its effect is not overstated in the baseline specification.
4. FACTS AND THEORIES
The results presented above have been descriptive, uncovering geographic variables
that predict land rights, slavery, and historic population density. In this section, I discuss
whether these correlations are consistent with influential theories of land rights and
slavery. I summarize the implications of these theories in Table 4.
4.1. Theories of land rights. The two most influential theories of land rights are those
that focus on population, and those that focus on trade. Boserup (1965) argues that ex-
ogenous population increase is the principal driver of agricultural intensification and
more permanent tenure. This is the intuition captured by the “land abundance” view
of African history. Austin (2009, p. 33), for example, argues that authorities were were
eager to attract more immigrants in order to subdue nature and their neighbors. Thus,
strangers could generally acquire land indefinitely for token payments, while citizens
were given land virtually for free (Austin, 2008a, p. 591-594). Formalizations of this the-
ory have captured these changes as the selection of certain production technologies in
response to the relative scarcity of land and labor (Hayami, 1997; Quisumbing and Ot-
suka, 2001), or as the profit-maximizing choice of an elite (Lagerlo¨f, 2009).
There is a positive correlation between population density and land rights in the full
sample that holds conditional on region fixed effects (nor reported). Within Africa, there
is still a positive correlation, though it is significant only at the 12% level (nor reported).
This is congruent with a population-centered view, though it does not specify the mech-
anism by which land scarcity leads property rights to emerge.
There is also substantial overlap between the geographic variables that predict greater
population and those that predict land rights. In the global sample, these include greater
land quality, less precipitation, a later date of observation, greater malaria prevalence,
LAND ABUNDANCE 15
greater ruggedness, and proximity to the equator. Conditional on region fixed effects,
this pattern is less clear. Similarly, there are many variables in the sub-Saharan Africa
sample that do not predict significant co-movement of population density and land
rights. These include date of observation, desert, elevation, and malaria. Together, these
results are supportive of a population-based mechanism that explains patterns of land
tenure across broad regions, but that becomes less powerful at explaining differences
within regions. This could be due, for example, to intra-regional spill-overs.
Trade-centered theories date at least as far back as Demsetz (1967). He argues that
land rights internalize externalities when the gains outweigh the costs. This drives en-
closure of the commons in the formal treatments of Hotte et al. (2000) or Copeland and
Taylor (2009), and explains the empirical results of Bogart and Richardson (2011). It is
similar to the greater effort expended in defending rights over more valuable resources
predicted by models of the economics of conflict (e.g. Baker (2003); Grossman and Kim
(1995)).
That better land predicts land rights is consistent with this view, since land that can
produce more valuable output will be more strongly defended. The lower prevalence of
land rights further from the equator is driven by the low-productivity zones of the Arctic
and Australian desert, reinforcing this interpretation. The data do not unambiguously
support a trade-centred view, however. The two controls that best capture trade in the
data – proximity to the coast and access to a major river – do not significantly predict
the existence of land rights. Within Africa, coastal distance enters significantly, but with
the wrong sign.
Beyond these two influential theories, there is a literature on the enclosure of com-
mon property (e.g. Baland and Francois (2005); Baland and Platteau (2003); Grantham
(1980); Lueck (1994); Netting (1976); Ostrom (1991); Runge (1986)). These works identify
several benefits of common property that help explain why it survives. These include
scale economies, risk pooling, exclusion and effort costs, and equity concerns. Many of
these benefits cannot be captured by the geographic variables included here. However,
the lack of a significant correlation with ecological risk and land rights in Table 2 is in-
consistent with models suggesting that common property over land is motivated by risk
pooling.
4.2. Theories of slavery. Several theoretical analyses of slavery and coercion exist (e.g.
Barzel (1977); Bergstrom (1971); Canarella and Tomaske (1975); Findlay (1975); Geni-
cot (2002)). Three of the most influential theories stress labor scarcity, the outside op-
tions available to workers, and the productivity of forced labor in specific tasks. Nieboer
(1900) and Domar (1970) both argue that coercion is cheaper than paying a wage when
labor is scarce and wages high. Proponents of the “land abundance” view of African
history, such as Austin (2008a, p. 606-610), build on this argument. Lagerlo¨f (2009) and
Conning (2004) both provide models that formally capture this intuition. In Lagerlo¨f
(2009), very low population densities also discourage slavery, since the opportunity cost
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of labor used to guard slaves is very high. Because land quality raises free wages for a
given population density, his model predicts that greater land quality can lead to the use
of slave labor.
The inverse-U correlation between slavery and population density in Figure 3 is sim-
ilar to the pattern predicted by the Lagerlo¨f (2009) model, though this would be pre-
dicted by many possible models in which slavery emerges during an intermediate state
of development. There is, however, little overlap between the variables that predict pop-
ulation density and those that predict slavery. Some variables predict that population
density and slavery move in the same direction (ruggedness), while others predict they
move in opposite directions (absolute latitude). The correlation of land quality with
slavery only holds in Africa. There are many possible reasons for this. The Lagerlo¨f
(2009) model may better apply to Africa than to other regions. Alternatively, the corre-
lation between slavery and the measure of a society’s dependence on agriculture in the
Ethnographic Atlas is greater in the sub-Saharan sample (ρ = 0.25) than in the rest of the
world (ρ = 0.04).
Several theories emphasize coerced workers’ outside options. North and Thomas
(1971), for example, hold that serfs voluntarily exchanged their labor for protection in
an environment where a lack of markets made it difficult for payments to occur in cash
or output. Several models find that worse outside options for workers increase the de-
gree of coercion in labor contracts (Beber and Blattman, 2012; Chwe, 1990).9 Similarly,
Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) find that labor scarcity has two effects, raising coercion
through a Domar-type increase in the price of output, but also reducing coercion by
improving workers’ outside options.
The evidence on outside options is mixed. There appears to be no strong link be-
tween slavery and distance from the coast, which would suggest that markets do not
matter much. Access to a major river predicts slavery, leading to the opposite conclu-
sion. Greater temperatures indicate less hospitable environments, where escape is more
difficult. Slavery is more common in these regions. By contrast, ruggedness is expected
to improve the outside option of slaves by making it easier for them to flee (Nunn and
Puga, 2012). Contrary to this intuition, the correlation between ruggedness and slavery
is positive.
In certain contexts, slavery may be more productive than free labor. Productivity-
centered views use this to explain its relative prevalence. For Fenoaltea (1984), this oc-
curs where “pain incentives” are effective and detailed care is unnecessary. Fogel and
Engerman (1974) link the productivity of slaves in the American south to economies of
scale that could only be achieved through gang labor. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997),
similarly, argue that the cultivation of crops with economies of scale is more conducive
9Naidu and Yuchtman (2012), by contrast, argue that British industrial workers committed to coercive
contracts in order to reduce wage variation.
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to slavery. Hanes (1996) explains the concentration of slaves in rural and domestic pro-
duction by invoking the high turnover costs in these industries.
The crop suitability measures in Table 3 do have predictive power. At face value, these
suggest that the relative productivity of different agricultural systems, conditional on
land quality as a whole, does predict differences in the use of slaves. These do not, how-
ever, map neatly into any classification according to economies of scale or productivity
under gang labor. Caribbean-type sugar plantations are not a feature of the indigenous
societies in the data.
4.3. Summary. The correlation of land rights with both population and its geographic
predictors is supportive of a population-centered view. There is less evidence for a
trade-centered view of land rights. In both cases, however, these theories better pre-
dict differences across regions than differences within regions.
The correlation of population density with slavery is similar to the specific population-
centered view of Lagerlo¨f (2009). That land quality better predicts slavery in Africa than
elsewhere supports application of this model to Africa alone. There is no strong evi-
dence in favor of a model centered on workers’ outside options. There is suggestive
evidence that the relative productivity of slaves in different agricultural systems con-
tributed to the prevalence of slavery, but it is difficult to map the broad crop types
recorded here into existing theories.
5. PERSISTENCE
In this section, I show that pre-colonial institutions of land rights, slavery, polygamy,
and states have persistent effects on present-day institutions in sub-Saharan Africa.
Though I have not focused on polygamy and states in the previous sections, they feature
largely in both the literature linking African institutions to sparse population (Herbst,
2000; Tambiah and Goody, 1973), and in the literature on current African development
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012; Tertilt, 2005).
5.1. Land Rights. In Table 5, I present estimates of (3). Pre-colonial land rights insti-
tutions predict the transactions that have been used to acquire plots of land in Ghana
in the present. Members of ethnic groups that historically practiced patrilineal inheri-
tance and those in which children could inherit land in the past are more likely to have
acquired their land through commercial transactions such as rental and sharecropping.
They are less likely to have acquired land through their village or family. Individuals
whose ethnic groups allowed children to inherit in the past are more likely to have
bought their current plot. Together, these results tell a consistent story; ethnic groups
in Ghana in which nuclear families had more control over land vis-a-vis lineages in the
pre-colonial period display greater commercialization of land in the present.
To account for spatial correlation at a level above the ethnic group, I also report stan-
dard errors clustered by region. These units are roughly equivalent to provinces, and
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there are 10 in Ghana. The significance of the results is unchanged, with one exception:
ethnic groups in which children inherited land in the past are no longer significantly
more likely to purchase land.
5.2. Slavery. In Table 5, I report estimates of equation (4) using slavery as a measure
of pre-colonial institutions. At the individual level, there is no evidence that past slav-
ery predicts polygamy in the present. Though there is a positive bivariate correlation
that survives the inclusion of past polygamy, this does not survive the inclusion of geo-
graphic and individual controls. In the child-level regressions, however, I find that chil-
dren whose ethnic groups practiced slavery in the past receive fewer vaccinations in the
present. Coefficients can be compared to the standard deviation of the dependent vari-
able, which is 3.33. Though this does not survive the inclusion of country-round fixed
effects, the point estimate remains negative. Standard errors are similar when clustered
by minor ethnographic region.
5.3. Polygamy. In Table 5, I present additional estimates of (4), using polygamy as a
measure of past institutions. Here, there is clear persistence. A woman whose ethnic
group regularly practiced polygamy in the past is roughly 10-14% more likely to be mar-
ried polygamously today. This is robust to additional controls and country-round fixed
effects.
5.4. State centralization. Though the importance of pre-colonial states for contempo-
rary African development has been established in other contexts (Gennaioli and Rainer,
2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012), I find no evidence in Table 5 that the
benefits of a pre-colonial state extend to the capacity of modern states to provide vacci-
nations to children.
5.5. Implications for comparative development. The persistent effects of pre-colonial
institutions are relevant to at least two literatures in comparative development. First, it
is not settled whether geography matters most for development through its direct ef-
fects (Sachs, 2003), through its impact on institutions (Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik
et al., 2004), or through its influence on culture (Alesina et al., 2011; Ashraf and Galor,
2011). Because the above results are conditional on geographic controls, these suggest
that historical institutions exert an influence over and above the direct effects of the ge-
ographic features that have shaped them. This does not rule out a direct role for geogra-
phy in shaping current institutions. Though I do not report coefficients on these, many
of the geographic controls are also significant predictors of contemporary institutions,
conditional on historic institutions.
Second, if indeed geography matters predominantly through institutions, the degree
to which colonialism brought about a “reversal of fortune” remains controversial (Ace-
moglu et al., 2002b; Austin, 2008b). The results here suggest that the institutional up-
heaval of colonial rule could not sweep away what came before it. Though the global
reversal is plainly visible, my results are consistent with other recent findings that the
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effects of colonial rule were heterogeneous (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Olsson, 2009), var-
ied according to local conditions (Arias and Girod, 2011; Bruhn and Gallego, 2012), and
that the evidence for an intra-African reversal is weaker than for a global reversal (Hop-
kins, 2009; Huillery, 2011).
6. CONCLUSION
Bad institutions are one of the fundamental causes of African poverty, and the institu-
tions that exist on the continent currently have been shaped by those that existed prior
to colonial rule. I have addressed a theme in the economics literature – how geogra-
phy affects institutions – by outlining the geographic features that predict the historical
prevalence of land rights, slavery, and dense population.
Though this exercise has been mostly descriptive, these results can be used to make
several points relevant to existing theories about land rights, slavery, and African history.
Historical population has evolved alongside these institutions in response to underly-
ing geographic characteristics. While institutional outcomes across broad ethnographic
regions are predicted by geography, these predictions become more tenuous when look-
ing within specific regions. Geographic correlates of land rights and slavery differ across
regions. Notably, land quality predicts slavery in Africa, but not elsewhere. Within Africa
and across the world, there is stronger evidence that land rights are present where land
is scarce and productive than there is of any link with trade. Though the results are
suggestive of connections between slavery and labor scarcity, workers’ outside options,
and the relative productivity of slaves in certain tasks, they cannot distinguish any one
explanation with dispositive clarity.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mean s.d. Min Max N Pct.
5 0.02 0.05 0.29
Any slavery 0.54 0.50 0 1 1,040 10 0.09 0.17 0.59
Any land rights 0.74 0.44 0 1 801 15 0.26 0.28 1.21
Historic pop density 42.7 141 2.6e-07 3,627 1,205 20 0.51 0.49 1.92
Land quality 1.33 0.90 -4.0e-07 3.98 1,205 25 1.21 0.88 2.58
Date observed 1,905 53.1 1,500 1,965 1,205 30 2.39 1.96 3.79
Precipitation 1,262 855 12.6 6,164 1,205 35 3.70 3.86 5.07
Temperature 7,198 2,776 35.5 10,830 1,205 40 5.78 7.08 6.61
Absolute latitude 20.7 17.0 0.017 78.1 1,205 45 7.64 10.03 8.27
Pct. malarial 0.17 0.20 0 0.69 1,205 50 10.04 14.72 10.10
Dist. to coast 4.26 3.88 0 16.5 1,205 55 12.56 19.39 13.11
Elevation 167 9.60 141 230 1,205 60 15.78 24.39 17.33
Major river 0.28 0.45 0 1 1,205 65 20.14 32.31 22.56
Ruggedness 121,220 132,855 137 977,941 1,205 70 25.97 40.25 29.84
Share desert 0.11 0.26 0 1 1,205 75 35.17 55.00 39.13
Rainfall C.V. 0.21 0.13 0.061 1.73 1,205 80 47.25 76.05 53.36
ln (1+ Atlantic exports/area) 0.16 0.51 0 3.66 532 85 62.98 105.86 71.90
ln (1+ Indian exports/area) 0.037 0.23 0 3.33 532 90 95.85 151.97 115.18
95 162.79 246.17 197.82
Any land 
rights
Any 
slavery
Historic 
pop 
density N
Africa 0.93 0.83 35.42 414
     + Ethiopia and the Horn + Moslem Sudan 0.93 0.84 35.51 486
     + Sahara + North Africa 0.93 0.84 35.65 526
Circum-Mediterranean 0.92 0.70 64.53 157
East Eurasia 0.83 0.54 154.27 123
Insular Pacific 0.73 0.24 41.74 119
North America 0.29 0.27 5.02 284
South America 0.27 0.27 12.21 109
Notes: Variable definitions are in the web appendix.
Means by major region
Table 1
Summary statistics and percentiles of population density
HYDE 
Estimate MJ Base
ARVE 
Base
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Land quality 0.048** 0.010 0.024*** 0.031 0.019 0.054*** 0.727*** 0.543*** 0.145*
(0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.029) (0.032) (0.018) (0.146) (0.109) (0.076)
Precipitation -0.051** 0.014 -0.005 -0.039 0.054 0.018 -0.763*** -0.191 -0.327
(0.022) (0.029) (0.022) (0.047) (0.046) (0.039) (0.218) (0.191) (0.200)
Temperature -0.025 -0.089** 0.010 0.221*** 0.184*** 0.132*** 0.231 -0.114 0.146
(0.038) (0.041) (0.013) (0.066) (0.056) (0.051) (0.364) (0.255) (0.164)
Date observed 0.047* 0.003 -0.026* -0.051** -0.084*** -0.019 0.471*** 0.071 0.914***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.139) (0.106) (0.122)
Share desert 0.020 0.005 -0.013 0.010 0.008 0.035 -0.114 -0.204 -0.193**
(0.021) (0.034) (0.016) (0.040) (0.035) (0.031) (0.212) (0.159) (0.085)
Dist. to coast -0.023 -0.015 0.021* 0.033 0.039 0.003 -0.328 -0.339** 0.020
(0.023) (0.023) (0.012) (0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.205) (0.149) (0.099)
Elevation -0.009 -0.020 -0.019 0.026 0.002 -0.001 -0.299* -0.276** -0.601***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.164) (0.135) (0.122)
Pct. malarial 0.173*** 0.068* 0.016 0.434*** 0.368*** 0.087*** 0.574** -0.095 0.221*
(0.031) (0.035) (0.011) (0.045) (0.058) (0.028) (0.247) (0.146) (0.121)
Ruggedness 0.054*** 0.035 0.044** 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.022 0.542*** 0.211 0.676***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.191) (0.150) (0.150)
Absolute latitude -0.103*** -0.147*** -0.094*** 0.175** 0.209*** -0.004 -0.757** -0.981*** -0.999***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.027) (0.072) (0.072) (0.066) (0.362) (0.305) (0.244)
Rainfall c.v. -0.013 -0.025 -0.005 0.020 0.034 -0.010 -0.320 -0.331** -0.148
(0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.204) (0.160) (0.122)
Major river -0.026 -0.021 -0.010 0.082* 0.072 0.053* 0.292 0.407** 0.084
(0.036) (0.040) (0.023) (0.046) (0.049) (0.031) (0.214) (0.167) (0.113)
Circum-Mediterranean 0.136** 0.077 1.205***
(0.066) (0.131) (0.352)
East Eurasia 0.010 -0.131 1.559***
(0.099) (0.160) (0.381)
Insular Pacific -0.270* -0.404*** -1.609***
(0.154) (0.154) (0.547)
North America -0.369* -0.338** -2.139***
(0.191) (0.151) (0.596)
South America -0.627*** -0.218 -4.036***
(0.125) (0.136) (0.780)
Observations 801 801 371 1,040 1,040 416 1,205 1,205 486
R-squared 0.440 0.590 0.919
Sample Full Full S.S. Africa Full Full S.S. Africa Full Full S.S. Africa
Notes: ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. Regressions with land rights and slavery are logit, with marginal effects
reported. Regressions with population density are OLS, with coefficients reported. In both cases, these are interpretable as the effect of a one
standard deviation change for continuous variables, and a one unit change for dummy variables. Each regression contains a constant (not
reported). Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Conley's (1999) method, with a distance cutoff of 10 decimal degrees. 
Any land rights Any slavery Log historic pop density
Table 2
Geographic correlates of historic institutions and population
(1) (2) (3)
Land quality 0.047 0.082** 0.042**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.018)
Precipitation -0.011 0.085 0.047
(0.052) (0.053) (0.045)
Temperature 0.209*** 0.150** 0.097***
(0.069) (0.066) (0.028)
Date observed -0.053** -0.090*** -0.036
(0.023) (0.030) (0.025)
Share desert 0.009 -0.011 0.021
(0.045) (0.039) (0.025)
Dist. to coast 0.035 0.046 0.002
(0.030) (0.029) (0.012)
Elevation 0.033 0.005 0.006
(0.029) (0.031) (0.021)
Pct. malarial 0.462*** 0.378*** 0.092***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.032)
Ruggedness 0.120*** 0.100*** -0.001
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027)
Absolute latitude 0.160** 0.190*** -0.019
(0.069) (0.072) (0.053)
Rainfall c.v. 0.025 0.027 -0.018
(0.030) (0.028) (0.027)
Major river 0.090* 0.086* 0.040*
(0.049) (0.052) (0.024)
Wheat suitability 0.022 -0.051 0.011
(0.037) (0.045) (0.022)
Maize suitability 0.009 0.057 0.031
(0.077) (0.078) (0.040)
Cereals suitability 0.091 0.005 -0.003
(0.083) (0.085) (0.030)
Roots/tubers suitability -0.131* -0.128* -0.095**
(0.073) (0.076) (0.044)
Pulses suitability 0.135* 0.156* 0.081**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.033)
Oil crops suitability -0.246*** -0.302*** -0.115***
(0.076) (0.071) (0.034)
Sugar suitability 0.063 0.127** 0.058*
(0.045) (0.050) (0.034)
Cotton suitability 0.075 0.091 0.029
(0.071) (0.072) (0.031)
Circum-Mediterranean 0.176
(0.122)
East Eurasia -0.211
(0.161)
Insular Pacific -0.483***
(0.132)
North America -0.374**
(0.147)
South America -0.269*
(0.139)
Observations 1,040 1,040 416
Sample Full Full S.S. Africa
Notes: ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. All
regressions are logit, with marginal effects reported. These are interpretable as
the effect of a one standard deviation change for continuous variables, and a one
unit change for dummy variables. Each regression contains a constant (not
reported). Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted using Conley's (1999)
method, with a distance cutoff of 10 decimal degrees. 
Table 3
Geographic correlates of slavery, including crop suitabilities
Any slavery
Examples Implications
Land rights
     Population-centred Boserup (1965), Hayami (1997),
Lagerlöf (2009), Quisumbing and
Otsuka (2001)
Variables that predict greater population will predict land
rights. In Lagerlöf, better land quality predicts land rights.
     Trade-centred Demsetz (1967), Hotte et al. (2000),
Copeland and Taylor (2009)
Variables that predict greater market values of output will
predict land rights.
Slavery
     Population-centred Conning (2004), Domar (1970),
Lagerlöf (2009), Nieboer (1900) 
Variables that predict lower population (Nieboer) or
intermediate population (Lagerlöf) will predict slavery. In
Lagerlöf, better land quality predicts slavery.
     Outside option-centred Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011), Beber
and Blattman (2012), Chwe (1990),
North and Thomas (1971)
Variables that improve workers' outside options or that make it
more difficult to coerce workers should reduce slavery.
     Productivity-centred Engerman and Sokoloff (1997),
Fenoaltea (1984), Fogel and Engerman
(1974), Hanes (1996)
Suitability for certain crops should make slavery more likely,
over and above the effect of land quality in general.
Table 4
Theories of land rights and slavery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: GLSS 5
Patrilineal land inheritance 0.012 0.073*** 0.124*** -0.245***
(0.011) (0.024) (0.038) (0.058)
[0.022] [0.021] [0.051] [0.058]
Children inherit land 0.025*** 0.066*** 0.095*** -0.227***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.024) (0.074)
[0.022] [0.014] [0.038] [0.079]
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,669 8,669 8,669 8,669 8,669 8,669 8,669 8,669
Panel B: DHS Individual Recodes
Usual polygyny 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.097*** 0.137*** 0.125*** 0.094***
(0.050) (0.026) (0.020) (0.050) (0.027) (0.020)
[0.048] [0.017] [0.020] [0.049] [0.018] [0.018]
Any slavery 0.143*** 0.015 0.040 0.144*** -0.006 0.021
(0.048) (0.033) (0.027) (0.049) (0.036) (0.030)
[0.060] [0.044] [0.027] [0.060] [0.048] [0.030]
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country-Round Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 235,408 156,108 156,108 235,372 156,556 156,556 231,460 153,978 153,978
Panel C: DHS Child Recodes
Any slavery -1.572*** -0.720** -0.189 -1.738*** -0.817** -0.261
(0.409) (0.326) (0.271) (0.416) (0.354) (0.272)
[0.491] [0.342] [0.228] [0.482] [0.321] [0.228]
State centralization 0.130 0.074 0.123 0.238 0.085 0.148*
(0.180) (0.108) (0.079) (0.167) (0.111) (0.080)
[0.173] [0.069] [0.049] [0.147] [0.069] [0.039]
Other controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country-Round Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 149,755 91,136 91,136 148,516 90,110 90,110 146,050 88,952 88,952
Polygamous
Total number of vaccines received
Notes: ***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. All regressions are OLS. All regressions include a constant (not 
reported). Other controls in the GLSS regressions include plot area, plot area squared, plot controller male, plot controller age and
age squared, dummy for household member, dummies for religion, dummies for region, and ecological zone dummies. Other
controls in the DHS individual recodes are absolute latitude, malaria prevalence, sutiability for rainfed agriculture, ruggedness,
elevation, distance to the coast, dummies for ecological type, year of birth, year of birth squared, dummies for religion, urban, age,
and age squared. Controls in the DHS child recodes include the same controls as in the individual recodes (which are now
maternal characteristics), as well as the child characteristics birth date, birth order, multiple birth, and female. Standard errors in
each regression are clustered by Ethnographic Atlas ethnicity. In the GLSS panel, additional standard errors clustered by region
are reported in brackets. In the DHS data, additional standard errors clustered by ethnographic region (e.g. Equatorial Bantu) are
reported in brackets.
Institutional persistence in sub-Saharan Africa
Table 5
Bought Rented
Distributed 
through village or 
familySharecropped
